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Long-run di¤erentials in interindustrial pro…tability are relevant for sev-
eral areas of theoretical and applied economics because they characterize
the overall nature of competition in a capitalist economy. This paper argues
that the existing empirical models of competition in the industrial organiza-
tion literature su¤er from serious ‡aws. An alternative framework, based on
recent advances in the econometric modeling of the long run, is developed
for estimating the size of long-run pro…t rate di¤erentials. It is shown that
this framework generates separate, industry-speci…c estimates of two poten-
tial components of long-run pro…t rate di¤erentials identi…ed in economic
theory. One component, the noncompetitive di¤erential, stem from factors
that do not depend directly on the state of competition; these factors are
generally characterized as risk and other premia. The other component, the
competitive di¤erential, is due to factors that directly depend on the state
of competition (factors such as degree of concentration and economies of
scale). Estimates provided here show that during the period under study,
the group of industries with statistically insigni…cant competitive di¤eren-
tials accounted for 72 percent of manufacturing pro…ts and 75 percent of
manufacturing capital stock, which is interpreted as lending support to the
theories of competition advanced by the classical economists and their mod-
ern followers.1 Introduction
The question of long-run di¤erentials in pro…tability across industries has
arisen in di¤erent areas of economics. In the traditional industrial organi-
zation literature this problem has been studied with the aim of determin-
ing the extent of monopoly power enjoyed by …rms in di¤erent industries
(Bain[1956], 1993). Monopoly power is usually considered as the degree to
which …rms can set prices above their marginal costs and monopoly prof-
its are, by de…nition, pro…ts above the competitive norm. The extent of
monopoly power would vary across industries according to interindustrial
di¤erences in structural characteristics such as concentration, product dif-
ferentiation and scale economies. The two dominant strands of Post Key-
nesian micro theory, deriving, respectively, from Kalecki and Eichner, have
also focused on the extent and role of market power that …rms exercise and
its impact on pro…tability (Sawyer, 1995).
Following the revival of classical political economy (Sra¤a, 1960), het-
erodox economists began to reexamine the classical notion of competition
and emphasize its salient di¤erences with the mainstream views of competi-
tion (Clifton, 1977; Semmler, 1984; Eatwell, 1982; Shaikh, 1980). The latter
conceptualize real-world competition as some sort of departure from the ide-
alized world of perfect competition and employ some version of marginalist
theory of value to explain prices and pro…ts in the real world. In contrast,
heterodox economists argued that perfect competition is not the appropriate
benchmark and that the marginalist theory of value is fundamentally ‡awed.
The formalization of classical theory of value proceeded on the assumption
of uniform pro…t rates across industries; but, it is necessary to emphasize
that this assumption was traditionally not made just for the sake of an-
1alytical ease and was not meant to be an unobservable theoretical axiom
(Ricardo[1821], 1951, pp.89-90; Marx[1894], 1981, p.252).1 On the contrary,
the tendential reduction of actual pro…t rates, adjusted for risk and other
premia, to a common average and the gravitation of actual prices around
prices corresponding to a general pro…t rate were considered as objective
phenomena which provided the practical foundation for a theory seeking to
determine the forces behind the general pro…t rate and prices of production.
Recent debates in heterodox macroeconomics around the issue of the
existence of “excess capacity” in the long-run have also evoked the nature
of long-run pro…t rate di¤erentials (Dutt, 1995; Glick and Campbell, 1995;
Duménil and Lévy, 1995). If indeed, the …rms in the economy maintain
signi…cant amount of excess capacity in the long-run, as argued by some Post
Keynesians, investment ‡ows need not respond to pro…t rate di¤erentials and
therefore there will not be any tendency toward the equalization of industrial
pro…t rates. Economists of a more classical persuasion have argued against
this view, contending that excess capacity will be eliminated in the long
run as a result of competition and pro…t maximization will ensure normal
capacity utilization rates in the long-run.
It is only natural that this common question appears to play a deci-
sive role in diverse research programs, theories and controversies, since the
question under consideration concerns the overall nature of competition un-
der capitalism. Almost all theories and models of di¤erent aspects of the
capitalist economy or the capitalist economy as a whole, involve implicit
or explicit assumptions about the competitive process. Likewise, it is also
1Consider the following passage: “The theoretical opinion ::: that each portion of
capital yields pro…t in a uniform way, expresses a practical state of a¤airs” (Marx[1894],
1981, p.270).
2natural that empirical …ndings and theoretical assumptions regarding com-
petition have crucial implications for public policy. Empirical …ndings of
the existence or nonexistence of monopoly power inform competition pol-
icy, regulation and legislation. The presence of excess capacity in the long
run imply that economic growth is primarily constrained by aggregate de-
mand and therefore government spending will generally impart a stimulus to
growth. Monopoly pro…ts in crucial sectors of the economy raise questions
about the distribution of income: Are monopoly pro…ts shared between the
workers and capitalists of these sectors? And if so, how does it shape the
wage di¤erentials between workers in these sectors and workers in the rest
of the economy? (Galbraith, 1998).
Given the importance of the issue, a huge literature exists on theoretical
and empirical analyses of competition. The focus of the present study is
on the latter type of analysis, especially as it pertains to the overall nature
of competition, rather than to competition in a narrowly de…ned industry.
I propose an empirical methodology to assess long-run pro…tability di¤er-
entials and present results from applying that methodology to the United
States manufacturing industries over the period 1947-1998. The rest of the
paper has the following structure. First, I discuss some problems with the
econometric models used in most empirical studies. An alternative frame-
work, based on vector autoregressive models of unit root processes, is pre-
sented next, followed by the empirical results obtained from the estimation
and inference conducted with that framework. The …nal section discusses
the limitations of the suggested approach and indicates possible future lines
of research.
32 Econometric models of pro…tability di¤erentials
Empirical studies on pro…tability di¤erentials conducted in the 1950s and
1960s focused on relating some indicator of pro…tability in a given year
or averaged over a very short period of time (3 or 4 years) to a set of
industry characteristics.2 The crux of the attack, inaugurated by Brozen
(1971a,b) and Demsetz (1973), on these early studies was that their data
and methods were prone to confound short-term disequilibria with structural
barriers to competition. Since theoretical predictions about pro…tability
di¤erentials pertain to long-run di¤erentials, it is di¢cult to provide an
economic interpretation of pro…tability di¤erentials estimated for a certain
point in time. As Mueller puts it, “these inherently short-run glimpses at the
pro…t–market structure relationships ::: run the risk of capturing transitory
correlations between market structure and pro…tability and inferring long
run causality.” (Mueller, 1986, p.1).
The implicit assumption made by the static, cross-sectional model that
the deviations from the long-run or equilibrium con…gurations found at a
given point in time is purely random and/or can be controlled for by ap-
propriate exogenous variables is questionable (Geroski, 1990). Consider the
usual static model of a particular industry’s long-run pro…t rate, r¤
i:
r¤
i = ci + xib+¹i (1)
where ci is a constant, xi a vector of explanatory variables such as measures
of concentration, product di¤erentiation, economies of scale etc., b a vector
2A comprehensive listing of the early studies can be found in Weiss (1974). For a
selective and critical survey of the important studies see Semmler (1984).
4of unknown parameters, and ¹i an error term with the usual properties. The
long-run prediction of uniform pro…tability and perfect competition can be
formulated as the null hypothesis of ci = c 8i and b = 0. However, the
results from such a hypothesis test will be misleading. While in theory what
appears on the left hand side of the equation is the long-run pro…t rate, in
practice, when data averaged over a few years or for a particular year is
taken, the variable that appears in place of the long-run pro…t rate is the
actual pro…t rate, ri. As a result, the estimated model is:
ri = ci + xib+"i (2)
implying that "i ´ ¹i +(ri¡r¤
i). In other words, the error term in equation
(2) contains, apart from the usual random shocks, a measurement error
equal to the deviation of the actual pro…t rate from the long-run pro…t
rate. As a result of the measurement error, the standard errors will tend
to be higher than their values corresponding to equation (1) thus biasing
the t–statistics downward. More importantly, if any of the variables in
xi is correlated with the deviation from equilibrium, (ri ¡ r¤
i), then the
parameter estimates from equation (2) will be biased (Geroski, 1990, p.18).
The possibility of such correlation is quite real when we consider the fact
that the explanatory variables included in the regression helps to determine
not just the equilibrium position but also the gravitational process around
the equilibrium position.
These considerations suggest that the static framework is not suitable
for measuring long-run pro…t rate di¤erentials in a world where industries
are constantly out of equilibrium and the dynamics of the pro…t rates are af-
fected by industry speci…c factors such as those contained in xi. A dynamic
5approach is de…nitely required in order to characterize pro…tability di¤eren-
tials in an economically meaningful manner. In a series of in‡uential works
Dennis Mueller used methods of time series analysis to measure long-run
pro…tability di¤erentials (Mueller, 1977,1986,1990). While Mueller’s main
interest was inter…rm pro…tability di¤erences, the time series approach pio-
neered by him came to be applied in the study of interindustrial di¤erences
in pro…tability also (Glick, 1985; Glick and Ehrbar, 1990; Kessides, 1990;
Christodoulopolus, 1996). The models employed by these authors are au-
toregressive (AR) models.
The prominent member of this family of models may be called the AR(1)
model of pro…t rates since an industry’s pro…t rate is considered as a …rst-
order autoregressive process in this model. The model posits that each
industry’s annual pro…t rate rit is potentially composed of three elements:
(1) a competitive rate c that is common to all industries; (2) a permanent
rent ri that is speci…c to each industry, which could be a risk premium; and
(3) a short-run pro…t rate di¤erential or rent sit:
rit = c + ri + sit (3)
The assumption that the pro…t rate di¤erential in one year is indepen-
dent of the previous year’s pro…t rate di¤erential is considered to be unre-
alistic. As a more reasonable approach, short-run rents are assumed to be
intertemporally related via a stationary AR(1) process:
sit = ¸isit¡1 + uit (4)
where uit is N(0;¾2
i) and j¸ij < 1 (Mueller, 1986, p.13; Mueller, 1990,
6p.35). If this is assumed to hold in each year, equation(3) can be rewritten
as:
rit = (1 ¡ ¸i)(c + ri) + ¸irit¡1 + uit (5)
Given the assumptions regarding ¸i and ¾2
i, the model can be estimated
using well-known methods. From the calculated values of its intercept b ®i
and the autoregressive coe¢cient b ¸i an estimate of the “permanent” element
in the pro…t rate rip = c + ri can be obtained:
c rip =
b ®i
1 ¡ b ¸i
(6)
If the pro…t rate di¤erentials did not contain any permanent components,
c rip will not di¤er signi…cantly across industries. The estimated parameter
b ¸i will then indicate the speed at which a particular industry’s pro…t rate
approaches the general pro…t rate. On the other hand, if c rip were to be
signi…cantly di¤erent across industries, it may be concluded that there exist
long-run interindustrial pro…t rate di¤erentials. In this case, each industry
has its own long-run center of gravity and the estimated parameter b ¸i will
indicate the speed of convergence to that industry–speci…c center of gravity.
While the above model is free from the type of problems associated with
the static cross-sectional models, it should be noted that it has its own prob-
lems. First, it is impossible to identify whether the estimated permanent
rent of an industry is above or below the competitive rate of return be-
cause c and ri are not separately estimated. Second, in so far as there are
industry-speci…c, relatively permanent factors such as risk and other premia
in‡uencing pro…t rates, the estimated permanent rents are likely to be dif-
ferent across industries. By testing the restriction that they are equal, what
7is being tested is the hypothesis that such factors do not count in the long-
run. This is clearly di¤erent from testing whether pro…t rates, adjusted for
risk and other premia, have a long-run tendency toward equality. Third, the
above formulation requires the competitive rate of return to stay at a …xed
level over time. While such an assumption would probably be reasonable
for relatively short periods of time (say 5-10 years), there is no guarantee
that it would hold over longer periods of time (40-50 years). The marxian
theory of the falling rate of pro…t would suggest that such an assumption
is inappropriate over longer periods of time (Marx[1894], 1981, pp.317-338).
Furthermore, for the sample I intend to study, it has been widely docu-
mented that the average pro…t rate in the U.S. manufacturing has declined
substantially over the postwar period, albeit with some recovery in the 1980s
and the 1990s (Shaikh, 1987; Duménil and Lévy, 1993; Zacharias, 2001).
An alternative formulation of the same basic model—which may be called
the AR(1) model of pro…tability di¤erentials—allows a way out from prob-
lems noted above by allowing the competitive rate of return, c, to vary over
time and assuming it to be equal to the average pro…t rate for all industries
rt at all points in time:
ct = rt (7)
Equation(3) then becomes
rit = rt + ri + sit (8)
Maintaining the same assumptions as before regarding sit and letting
±it = rit ¡ rt a new version of equation(5) emerges:
8±it = (1 ¡ ¸i)ri + ¸i±it¡1 + uit (9)
The estimation of the model speci…ed by equation (9) will allow the
assessment of interindustrial di¤erences in ri and the rate of convergence
¸i. While the model of pro…t rates presented by Mueller (1986,1990) uses
the speci…cation in equation (5), the model estimated by Mueller (1990)
employs the speci…cation in equation (9). The latter is also the model of
Glick (1985), Glick and Ehrbar (1990) and Geroski (1990).
While the alternative speci…cation appears to avoid some of the di¢cul-
ties associated with the original model, this appearance is misleading. First,
if an assumption is explicitly made about the equality between the long-run
competitive rate of return and the annual average pro…t rate, it must be
admitted that such an assumption is only as valid as the implicit assump-
tion in the static models that the long-run con…gurations can be estimated
from the data for a single year. As noted above, it was the questioning of
this assumption that gave rise to time series models. Of course, such an
assumption is only su¢cient, not necessary, to arrive at the AR(1) model of
pro…t rate di¤erentials. One may begin from equation (8), (as, for example,
in Glick and Ehrbar (1990)) and justify the taking of annual pro…t rate dif-
ferentials, rather than pro…t rates, as the variable of interest on the grounds
that it factors out business cycles and common trends. As we shall see later,
ignoring common trends when they are present can represent a serious loss
of information which can be utilized in studying pro…t rate dynamics.
Second, the AR(1) model of pro…t rate di¤erentials does not improve
matters with respect to testing for pro…t rate equalization. Indeed, the es-
timate of the permanent rent now does not include the competitive rate of
9return; but, once again, the hypothesis of equalization can only be formu-
lated as the equality of permanent rents across industries, and therefore,
this model su¤ers from the same de…ciency that was noted for the AR(1)
model of pro…t rates. An important limitation of both models is that no
distinction is made between two potential components of observed pro…t
rate di¤erentials. The …rst component, as is generally recognized, may exist
in a particular industry due to time–invariant factors (such as risk, pecu-
liarities of the line of business, etc.) speci…c to that industry. I call this
the noncompetitive pro…t rate di¤erential (or the noncompetitive di¤eren-
tial for short) in order to emphasize the fact that it is not directly related to
the state of competition. The actual pro…t rate di¤erential of any industry
may also contain a dynamic component related to the manner in, and the
extent to which competition a¤ects that industry as mediated by barriers
to entry/exit which themselves will change over time. I call this the com-
petitive pro…t rate di¤erential (or the competitive di¤erential for short) in
order to emphasize the fact that it is directly related to the state of com-
petition. Estimates of permanent rents generated by the time series models
discussed above consist of both these components. As a result, even though
permanent rents may di¤er signi…cantly across industries, in the absence of
separate estimates of the two potential components of pro…t rate di¤eren-
tials, it is di¢cult to assess the implications of the estimated permanent
rents for the nature of competition.
The approach taken by Mueller and others (see Mueller, 1986, pp.77,125;
Mueller, 1990, p.42; Kessides, 1990, pp.73–4; Odagiri and Yamawaki, 1990,
p.135) is to treat the estimated permanent rents as the dependent variable
to be explained by a set of industry–speci…c characteristics associated with
barriers to entry/exit, such as advertising/sales ratios, concentration ratios
10etc. At best, this procedure can provide estimates of how much on the
average, for all industries, is the variation in permanent rents due to in-
dustry characteristics. It does not produce estimates of the e¤ects of these
characteristics on the pro…tability of a speci…c industry.
Finally, the statistical model employed in any study has to take into
account the prominent features of the data to avoid speci…cation errors.
The data used in the present study (described fully later) are the pro…t
rates of 20 U.S. manufacturing industries during the period 1947–1998. As
a speci…cation test for the AR(1) model of pro…t rates, unit root tests were
conducted and the results are displayed in Figure 1.

































































test statistics 5% critical value 2.5% critical value
Note: (i) The test statistics reported are for the Augmented
Dicky-Fuller (ADF) test and the Phillips-Perron (PP) test. (ii)
11The critical values are taken from Hamilton (1994, Table B.6,
p.763). (iii) The residuals from the ADF test equations for three
industries (14, 15 and 19) displayed serial correlation, and there-
fore the PP test was used for these three industries. (iv) The
critical values applicable to the test equations of a few indus-
tries are higher because no trend term was included in their test
equations. The need for a decision about the trend term arose
when there was a con‡ict between the outcome from test equa-
tion with trend and test equation with no trend. To resolve the
con‡ict, the joint null hypothesis of unit root and no trend was
tested. The failure to reject the null was taken as indicating that
the appropriate test equation was one with no trend. (v) The
overall manufacturing is identi…ed by the number 0 in the graph.
For the list of industries, see Table 1.
For 15 out of the 20 industries, the null hypothesis of unit root could
not be rejected at the 5% level of signi…cance. If the region of acceptance is
expanded slightly to 2.5%, it can be seen that the null hypothesis could not
be rejected in18 out of the 20 cases. Similarly, the overall manufacturing
pro…t rate also appears to be a unit root process. The results thus indicate
that the AR(1) model of pro…t rates may not be suitable for the particular
sample studied here. The alternative model—the AR(1) model of pro…t
rate di¤erentials—will not exploit the nonstationarity of the data since it
simply assumes that a linear combination of an industry’s pro…t rate and the
general pro…t rate with coe¢cients (1;¡1) is stationary. One way to express
this assumption is to postulate that an industry’s pro…t rate is cointegrated
with the general pro…t rate with the cointegrating vector (1;¡1). While such
12a proposition can be admitted as a hypothesis to be tested regarding the
pro…t rates, it is strange to adopt it as an assumption in a model that seeks
to estimate long-run pro…t rate di¤erentials. In the next section, I suggest
an alternative time series model based on the notion of cointegration that
can handle the nonstationarity found in the data (as suggested by the unit
root tests) and provide a consistent framework for testing the hypothesis of
pro…t rate equalization. The model for the pro…t rates for which the null
hypothesis of unit root could be rejected will be discussed later in Section
4.4.
3 A cointegrating VAR model of pro…tability dif-
ferentials
Formal models of classical competitive dynamics (see, for example, Duménil
and Lévy, 1993, pp.82–94; pp.102–108) have at their core a relatively simple
idea: outputs of industries will respond to investment ‡ows generated by
pro…tability di¤erentials and prices of their products will respond to supply-
demand imbalances. The reaction coe¢cients governing these adjustment
processes have to be assumed to be“small” for the process not to be dy-
namically unstable. Granted such an assumption, the adjustment processes
described above will lead to the establishment of long-run prices correspond-
ing to a uniform pro…t rate if the underlying technology remains unchanged
and satis…es a few assumptions that is found in the usual static versions
of the classical theory of value (for example, that the activity levels are
su¢cient to produce a net output).
If a description, as distinct from an explanation, of the pro…t rate paths
of individual industries in such models is sought, it could be thought of
13as a process in which the current value of the pro…t rate of an industry
is driven inexorably towards the long-run equilibrium pro…t rate by the
past values of its own pro…t rate and the combined average pro…t rate of
other industries. As a practical matter, however, there are two respects
in which the description should be of a more general character than what
is postulated in the models. First, because in reality, especially when data
spanning several decades are under consideration as in the present study, the
long-run pro…t rate itself is changing, the description must allow for such a
possibility. It is also necessary, as discussed in the previous section, to be
able to distinguish between competitive and noncompetitive di¤erentials.
These considerations can be formalized in a bivariate VAR(1) for the jth
industry’s pro…t rate, rj, and the combined pro…t rate for the remaining
industries, r:3
rjt = c1 + a11rjt¡1 + a12rt¡1 + e1t (10)
rt = c2 + a21rjt¡1 + a22rt¡1 + e2t
In these pair of equations c1 and c2 are constants, and, e1t and e2t are
Gaussian error terms. Subtracting rjt¡1 from both sides of the …rst equation
and subtracting rt¡1 from both sides of the second equation yields:
4rjt = c1 ¡ [(1 ¡ a11)rjt¡1 ¡ a12rt¡1] + e1jt (11)
4rt = c2 ¡ [¡a21rjt¡1 + (1 ¡ a22)rt¡1] + e2jt
Assuming that rjt and rt are unit root processes, the hypothesis of a
3One could add more lags to these equations, but, that would not change the logic of
the argument.
14stable, long-run relationship between the two pro…t rates can be expressed
as a hypothesis of cointegration between them. The assumption regarding
stationarity is justi…able in light of the unit root tests results reported earlier.
The general pro…t rate appearing in each industry’s model was also subjected
to unit root tests. The results (not reported here) showed that the null
hypothesis of unit root could not be rejected at the 5% level of signi…cance.
Therefore, the hypothesis of cointegration can be expressed as a restriction
on the coe¢cient matrix in equation (11):4
2
4 (1 ¡ a11) ¡a12















The cointegrating vector in the last equation is ¯, and the vector of
adjustment speeds is ®. Substituting the new coe¢cient matrix (®¯0) for
the old one in (11) yields the following pair of equations:
4rjt = c1 ¡ ®1 [¯1rjt¡1 + ¯2rt¡1] + e1jt (12)
4rt = c2 ¡ ®2 [¯1rjt¡1 + ¯2rt¡1] + e2jt
In long-run equilibrium with no shocks, the following condition must be
satis…ed:
4See, for example, Hamilton (1994, p.579-580).
154rjt = 4rt = e1jt = e2jt = 0
So that:
0 = c1 ¡ ®1 [¯1rj + ¯2r] (13)
0 = c2 ¡ ®2 [¯1rj + ¯2r]























where cj is a constant that can be interpreted as the noncompetitive
di¤erential. Let ¯j = ¯2=¯1. The long-run relation between rj and r can
thus be written as:5
5I am assuming here that the long-run relationship between the two pro…t rates includes
a constant cj. However, no restrictions are imposed on c1 and c2 in the estimation of the
system (equation (12)). As is well known, this implies that I am allowing for a linear time
trend in the data. See, for example, Hamilton (1994, p.581).
16rj = cj ¡¯jr
Subtracting r from both sides yields the long-run pro…t rate di¤erential,
dj:
dj ´ rj ¡ r = cj ¡(¯j + 1)r (14)
= rjp + rjcr
where cj ´ rjp is the noncompetitive di¤erential and ¡(¯j + 1) ´ rjc
is the competitive di¤erential. The hypothesis of pro…t rate equalization
in the long-run can now be postulated as a hypothesis that states that the
competitive di¤erential is zero:
¯j = ¡1 (15)
which, if found true, would imply that the long-run pro…t rate di¤erential
of the jth industry consists solely of the noncompetitive di¤erential.
4 Empirical results
The model sketched above was implemented in three stages: First, cointegra-
tion tests were conducted for the jth industry’s pro…t rate and the combined
pro…t rate of the remaining industries. Second, the estimates of the two pa-
rameters of interest, rjp and rjc were obtained. Finally, the hypothesis of
equalization was tested, including for those industries whose pro…t rates did
not contain any unit roots. I begin with a description of the data and then
present the results.
174.1 Data
I focus exclusively on the manufacturing sector. All the data used come from
the Bureau of Economic Analysis, United States Department of Commerce
and were downloaded from their website. National income related data such
as gross domestic product, employee compensation, indirect business taxes,
capital consumption allowances and net interest payments are taken from
the Industry Economics Division’s Gross Product Originating (GPO) by
industry data.6 The data on capital stock as well as depreciation are from
the Bureau’s Wealth Statistics Division. The pro…t rate series calculated
from the two data sources span the period 1947–98.
The industrial classi…cation used in the capital stock data is the two–
digit 1987 Standard Industrial Classi…cation (SIC) system. On the other
hand, in the GPO by industry data there are two di¤erent classi…cation
systems: the two–digit 1972 SIC prior to 1987 and thereafter the two–digit
1987 SIC. The break in the classi…cation system mainly a¤ected, within the
manufacturing sector and at the two–digit level of aggregation, industries
producing electronic and electrical goods and/or instruments etc.
I have attempted to ensure intertemporal comparability by aggregating
the two industries into a single industry, referred to as Electric and electronic
equipment and Instruments in the list of industries shown in Table 1. This
industry is the combination of two 1972 SIC industries prior to 1987: Elec-
tric and electronic equipment and Instruments and related products. From
1987 onwards, the industry is the combination of two 1987 SIC industries:
Electronic and other electric equipment and Instruments and related prod-
ucts. The two combinations are practically equivalent (see, for example,
6A discussion of the underlying methodology can be found in Yuskavage (1996).
18Yuskavage, 1996, Table 13, n1, p.153).
The above modi…cations reduced the number of industries in our sample
to 20 as compared to 21 industries in the two–digit SIC system. The list of
industries is given below in Table 1.
Table 1. List of industries
1 Lumber and wood products
2 Furniture and …xtures
3 Stone, clay and glass products
4 Primary metal industries
5 Fabricated metal products
6 Industrial machinery and equipment
7 Electric and electronic equipment and instruments
8 Motor vehicles and equipment
9 Other transportation equipment
10 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries
11 Food and kindred products
12 Tobacco manufactures
13 Textile mill products
14 Apparel and other textile products
15 Paper and allied products
16 Printing and publishing
17 Chemicals and allied products
18 Petroleum and coal products
19 Rubber and miscellaneous plastic products
20 Leather and leather products
19The indicator of pro…t rate that is used in this study is the net pro…t
rate, r, calculated as follows:
r =
GPO¡ employee compensation ¡ indirect taxes ¡ depreciation
Net …xed capital
All the variables are measured in current prices. Results from using
gross pro…t rate, which would di¤er from the net pro…t rate by its exclusion
of depreciation in the numerator and the replacement of net …xed capital
with gross …xed capital, as the indicator of pro…t rate are presented in
Zacharias (1997). The results from excluding net interest payments from
the measure of pro…ts in both indicators are also presented there. Other
possible indicators and their rami…cations for the hypothesis of equalization
are analyzed in a forthcoming paper by the author.
4.2 Testing for cointegration
The Johansen cointegration test was conducted for each industry’s pro…t
rate and the combined average pro…t rate of all the remaining industries.
(In order to avoid cumbersome expressions, I will refer to this combined
average pro…t rate of the remaining industries as “the general pro…t rate,”
although its very de…nition points to the fact that it will be di¤erent for each
industry.) The results, reported previously, from testing for unit roots in
industry pro…t rates indicated that apart from two industries—Lumber and
wood products and Fabricated metal products—the pro…t rate of all industries
did contain unit roots. A separate bivariate error correction model was set
up for the general pro…t rate and each industry’s pro…t rate that contained a
unit root. The maximum lag length for the underlying vector autoregressive
model was set equal to 4 and model selection was done using the Schwarz
20Bayesian Criteria (SBC). For all industries, the SBC recommended a lag
length of 1. There were thus eighteen error-correction models of the type
shown in (1) to be estimated. Maximum likelihood estimation of the models
was performed using the algorithm developed by Johansen (1988,1991).
The null hypothesis of no cointegration was tested using the ¸max test
and the trace test. The null hypothesis was rejected in cases where the
calculated test statistic in at least one test exceeded the critical value at
the 5% level of signi…cance. The critical values used are the ones reported
in Hamilton (1994, Tables B10 and B11, pp.767-768). The models in which
cointegration was found to be a valid restriction were subjected to two types
of misspeci…cation tests. The …rst one tested the residuals of the error correc-
tion model of each industry for serial correlation using the Breusch-Godfrey
test. The second one tested whether the residuals followed a normal distri-
bution using the Jarque–Bera test statistic. Serial correlation or departures
from normality were found to be a problem for …ve industries. Invariably,
these were related to the pro…t rate in a particular year taking an extraordi-
nary value, presumably as a result of some transient shock. In these cases,
a dummy variable for that particular year was added to the error-correction
model.
The results shown in Figure 2 indicate that out of the eighteen industries,
a statistically signi…cant cointegrating relationship was found for sixteen
industries using the trace test.7 There are two industries, Stone, clay and
glass products and Tobacco products, for which the null hypothesis of no
cointegration could not be rejected. The overwhelming majority of the pro…t
rates in our sample do have a cointegrating relationship with the general
7Out of these 16 industries, 4 failed to show any cointegration at the 5% level using
the ¸max test. Their identi…cation numbers are 2, 8, 13, and 17.
21Figure 2: Cointegration test statistics







































































pro…t rate and therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that the model is
capable of capturing the essential aspects of the dynamics of industrial pro…t
rates. Subsequent empirical analysis will be mostly con…ned to the pro…t
rates which were found to be individually cointegrated with the general
pro…t rate. The pro…t rate di¤erentials of the two industries that failed the
unit root tests will be assessed using an alternative approach discussed in
Section 4.4.
4.3 Long-run pro…t rate di¤erentials and their stability
The maximum likelihood estimates of the noncompetitive and competitive
pro…t rate di¤erentials, represented respectively by the parameters rjp and
rjc in equation (14), can be obtained in a straightforward manner once the
error-correction model is estimated. They are shown in Figure 3.
The most striking feature of the results is that the noncompetitive pro…t






















































rate di¤erential is quite small relative to the competitive pro…t rate dif-
ferential for most industries. This is well re‡ected in the fact that the
average noncompetitive di¤erential for the sample is only about one-tenth
of the average competitive di¤erential. Thus the overwhelming portion of
interindustrial pro…t rate di¤erentials may not be accounted for by time–
invariant industry speci…c factors such as risk etc., but by the speci…c man-
ner in which interindustrial competition operates dynamically in di¤erent
industries. This …nding is in stark contrast to the conclusion of Glick (1985)
and Glick and Ehrbar (1990)—studies which most closely resemble the cur-
rent one in terms of the industrial classi…cation used and the de…nition of
pro…tability. They concluded that the main source of interindustrial di¤er-
ences in average pro…t rates was risk as measured by the variance of industry
pro…t rates. The contrast in …ndings may be attributed to the fact that while
these authors implicitly lumped together the two components of pro…t rate
23di¤erential, the model estimated here distinguishes between the competitive
di¤erential and the noncompetitive di¤erential.
The estimates suggest, as one would expect, that there is consider-
able interindustrial variation in the relationship between the long-run (esti-
mated) and actual path of pro…t rate di¤erentials. The observed variations
are mainly due to the interindustrial di¤erences in competitive di¤erentials
which determine how much of the changes in the general pro…t rate is trans-
mitted to a particular industry and the nature of shocks a¤ecting individual
industries. The di¤erences arising from the use of di¤erent general pro…t
rates in each industry’s equation does not a¤ect the results because the
general pro…t rates do not di¤er from each other in any signi…cant way.
The long-run pro…t rate di¤erentials estimated above refers to the pro…t
rate di¤erentials that would obtain in a situation with no shocks to the
pro…t rates and no short run dynamics. Indeed, this hardly occurs in prac-
tice. An advantage of the model is that it is able to extract from the data,
information regarding the centers of gravity to which industrial pro…t rates
have an inherent tendency to move, without ever actually reaching them due
to frequent and often large shocks driving them o¤ the long-run trajectory.
Furthermore, some insight into the structural stability of the estimated long-
run centers of gravity can be gained by examining how quickly the impact
on the cointegrating relation of a one-standard deviation shock to the sys-
tem can be expected to die out. Of course, since the pro…t rates modelled
here are assumed to be unit root processes, such shocks will have permanent
e¤ects on the levels of the pro…t rates. However, the existence of the coin-
tegrating relation between an industry’s pro…t rate and the general pro…t
rate will ensure that the e¤ects of such shocks will eventually vanish when
the linear combination of these two variables, with the weights given by
24Figure 4: Persistence pro…les of pro…t rates









the cointegrating vector, is considered. The time period taken for this to
happen may be thought of, following Pesaran and Shin (1996), as the speed
at which a particular industry’s pro…t rate returns to its long-run center of
gravity following a system-wide shock. The trajectory on which this return
to the long-run center of gravity moves has been called the “persistence pro-
…le.” The persistence pro…les of the pro…t rates under consideration here
are shown in Figure 4.
The results depicted suggest that the industrial pro…t rates return to
their long-run rather quickly after a system-wide shock. For most industries,
over 80 percent of the e¤ects of the shock vanishes within a 2-3 year period.
A couple of industries have a slightly ‡atter persistence pro…les; but, even in
their case most of the impact of the shock is gone within a 3-4 year period.
254.4 Testing equalization
I turn now to the main task of the paper: A test of the hypothesis that the
pro…t rate of an industry, when adjusted for risk and other premia, is equal-
ized with the general pro…t rate in the long run. In terms of the model dis-
cussed so far, such a test is equivalent to ascertaining whether the estimated
competitive pro…t rate di¤erential of an industry is statistically signi…cant.
If, in the long run, the competitive pro…t rate di¤erential is equal to zero
in every industry we can take this as evidence supporting the hypothesis
of pro…t rate equalization since the long-run pro…t rate di¤erential of any
industry will then re‡ect only the noncompetitive di¤erential. Formally, for
such a hypothesis to be accepted, the elements of the cointegrating vector,
¯1 and ¯2, have to be equal to each other with opposite signs (see equations
(12) and (15)). This is a linear restriction on the cointegrating vector and on
the basis of the results arrived at by Johansen (see Johansen, 1990, p.193)
the test can be conducted as a likelihood ratio test. The values of the test
statistic (which has an asymptotic chi-squared distribution with one degree
of freedom) for the industries under study here are shown in Figure 5 along
with the critical values at the 5% and 1% levels of signi…cance.
The results indicate that the competitive pro…t rate di¤erentials of 12 out
of 16 industries are not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero at the 1% level. The
results con…rm, for the most part, the expectations one might have formed
on the basis of the estimates of competitive pro…t rate di¤erentials shown
in Figure 3. Industries with relatively lower (in absolute terms) estimates
of competitive di¤erential are also likely to be industries with a long-run
pro…t rate similar to the general pro…t rate. Exceptions to this rule does
exist—an apparent inconsistency that may due to the fact that the valid re-
26Figure 5: Test statistics for pro…t rate equalization
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27striction about the cointegrating vector was not incorporated in the original
estimation of pro…t rate di¤erentials for these cases.
How important is the group of industries with equalized pro…t rates
within the manufacturing sector? I answer this question by considering the
share that the industries with equalized pro…t rates have had in the capi-
tal stock and pro…ts for the entire manufacturing sector during the sample
period. The logic is that although these industries is a numerical majority,
if the bulk of the capital stock and the realized pro…ts belong to the indus-
tries with persistent competitive di¤erentials, then the equalization process
can not be taken as a dominant tendency in the manufacturing sector. The
numerical majority that had pro…t rates roughly equal to the general pro…t
rate will then not be an economically signi…cant majority. The shares of
this groups of industries in capital stock and pro…ts over the sample period
is shown in Figure 6.
The weight of the industries with equalized pro…t rates is somewhat
larger when the “weight” is judged according to their share in capital stock
than in pro…ts: the average during the period 1951-1998 for the former share
was 67 percent as compared to 61 percent for the latter. In either case, what
is interesting here is to observe that the majority of pro…ts and capital stock
in the manufacturing sector belonged to industries that have, in the long
run, pro…t rates not statistically di¤erent from the general pro…t rate. As a
corollary, it may be also be observed that as a group, the industries that were
found to have signi…cant competitive di¤erentials and the industries about
which the present model is silent regarding their pro…t rate di¤erentials, have
enjoyed a higher pro…t rate on the average than those industries found to
have no signi…cant competitive di¤erentials. (The shares of the former group
in capital stock and pro…ts are, respectively, 33 percent and 39 percent.)
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29I now turn to the industries which were excluded from the formal test of
equalization reported above to examine how the above conclusion may be
modi…ed when their pro…t rate di¤erentials are taken into account.
Two industries—Lumber and wood products and Fabricated metal products—
were excluded from the analysis so far because their pro…t rates were found
to be stationary in levels. Two other industries—Stone, clay and glass prod-
ucts and Tobacco products—were excluded because their pro…t rates were
not cointegrated with the general pro…t rate. The question now at hand is
whether the competitive pro…t rate di¤erentials of these industries can be
considered as signi…cant. I do not attempt to solve the problem posed by
the pro…t rates that were not cointegrated with the general pro…t rate here,
so the only problem tackled is the one posed by pro…t rates that were found
to be stationary.
A possible solution to the problem is to adopt an alternative method
to estimate the long-run relationship between an industry’s pro…t rate and
the general pro…t rate. Such an alternative can be found in the autoregres-
sive distributed-lag (ARDL) approach to cointegration developed in Pesaran
and Shin (1995). An advantage of the ARDL approach as compared to
the Johansen approach is that the long-run relationship between the pro…t
rates can be estimated in a statistically satisfactory fashion, irrespective of
whether the industry pro…t rate and the general pro…t rate are unit root
processes. This is an attractive feature in the current context because the
two industry pro…t rates under consideration were found not to be unit
root processes. A crucial di¤erence between the Johansen approach and
the ARDL approach is that the latter would explicitly treat one of the two
pro…t rates, the general pro…t rate, solely as a right-hand side variable, in
contrast to the symmetrical treatment of both pro…t rates in the former.
30This can lead to speci…cation errors if the pro…t rate dynamics of a given
industry is to in‡uence the combined pro…t rate of other industries. Such
e¤ects can be expected to be negligible or small in a sample with a large
number of industries or …rms. However, in the sample used here, the level
of aggregation is relatively high and it may not be appropriate to rule out
such e¤ects by assumption.
I used the method recommended in Pesaran and Shin (1995) to test
whether the general pro…t rate could be treated as the right-hand side vari-
able, or the “long-run forcing” variable, for the two industries. The test
statistics (reported in Table 2) favored such a treatment. Estimates of the
noncompetitive and competitive di¤erentials for the two industries were then
obtained and the null hypothesis of no competitive di¤erentials was tested.
The results are shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Long-run di¤erentials in two industries
Industry F(ri j r) F(r j ri) c rjc c rjp Â2(1)
Lumber and wood 15.159 2.692 0.106 0.146 0.732
Fabricated metal 10.344 2.537 0.043 0.019 0.012
Notes: (i) Both equations had the dimension of (2,1) as
recommended by the Schwarz Bayesian Criteria. (ii) The F-
statistics refer to the test of the null hypothesis that the last
year’s pro…t rate of an industry and the last year’s general pro…t
rate are insigni…cant in the equations for 4ri(F(ri j r)) and
4r(F(r j ri)). The critical values are di¤erent from the standard
ones for reasons explained in Pesaran and Shin (1995). The 5%
critical value band applicable here is 4.934–5.764. (iii) The Â2
31test statistic refer to the test of the null hypothesis that rjc = 0.
The 5% critical value is 3.84.
The results suggest that competitive di¤erentials are quite small and
statistically insigni…cant for both industries. Combining the results above
with the one arrived at earlier regarding equalization, it emerges that the
null hypothesis of pro…t rate equalization could not be rejected for 14 out
of the 20 industries in the sample. In terms of the shares in manufacturing
capital stock and pro…ts, this group of industries have expanded, respectively
to 75 percent and 72 percent. The movement of these shares over the period

































The weight of “equalizers”
Note: The “equalizers” refer to the group of industries for
which the null hypothesis of pro…t rate equalization could not be
32rejected either under the Johansen method or the ARDL method.
It is striking how the discrepancy between the two shares is closing over
time. This suggests that the lower pro…tability of this group—compared to
the pro…tability of the remaining industries taken together—has dissipated
as a result of the investment ‡ows that such a discrepancy might have trig-
gered. However, it should be noted that for the period as a whole, this group
of industries had a relatively lower average pro…t rate.
The …nding that the industries for which the null hypothesis was rejected
consists solely of industries with higher than average long-run pro…t rates
may seem to …t with the characterization of these industries as oligopolistic.
The industries Industrial machinery and equipment, Electric and electronic
equipment and instruments, and Other transportation equipment have been
generally considered by most applied studies in the structure–performance
paradigm and by Post Keynesian authors such as Eichner as dominated by
corporations with a great deal of market power (Eichner, 1991, p.250). While
such a characterization of these industries may or may not be appropriate,
there are two reasons why my …ndings as a whole cannot be explained on
the basis of oligopoly and market power. First, among the industries for
which the null hypothesis of pro…t rate equalization was accepted there are
some prominent oligopolistic industries as exempli…ed by Primary metals,
Food and kindred products, and Chemicals and allied products. Second, in
addition to the three industries just mentioned, an industry usually consid-
ered as a nonoligopolistic industry—Apparel and other textile products—was
also found to have a long-run pro…t rate signi…cantly higher than the gen-
eral pro…t rate. The competitive process as modelled here appears to be an
active force in industries traditionally classi…ed as competitive as well as in
33those traditionally classi…ed as oligopolistic industries.
In order to interpret the result that a majority of industries have long-run
pro…t rates not signi…cantly di¤erent from the general pro…t rate, it is useful
to recall that the equalization of pro…t rates is considered in the classical
theory as a “general law” of political economy and there is a considerable
epistemological gap between the notion of a general law and the statistical
conception of long run employed here. The former allows for relatively
greater room for ambiguity as well as greater ‡exibility when it comes to
the study of the actual evolution of an industry or a group of industries. The
results arrived at regarding equalization on the basis of a statistical model
cannot hope to capture the real diversity in industrial evolution. However,
the general law is only expected to hold as an observable persistent feature,
as a “dominant tendency” of the capitalist accumulation process: “Within
the whole of capitalist production, it is always only in a very intricate and
approximate way, as an average of perpetual ‡uctuations which can never
be …rmly …xed, that the general law prevails as the dominant tendency”
(Marx[1894], 1981, p.261; emphasis added).8 The null hypothesis of pro…t
rate equalization is therefore not expected to be accepted for every industry
but only for a signi…cant number of industries, accounting for the dominant
portion of pro…ts and capital invested in the manufacturing sector.
5 Conclusions
A distinct feature of a developed capitalist economy like the United States is
the provision of the vast majority of goods and services by privately owned,
8For a methodological discussion of the notion of “dominant tendency” and its di¤er-
ences from the standard notion of equilibrium see Shaikh (1981).
34pro…t–seeking …rms. Pro…tability serves as the basic guide for the numerous
actions …rms take regarding production, technology and growth. Classical
theory of value and distribution provides a consistent and coherent expla-
nation of how pro…ts arise under capitalist relations of production and why
it is the driving force in the capitalist economy. The process of competition
as conceived in the classical theory is inherently anarchic and turbulent,
quite removed from the tranquil and impotent notion of perfect competition
which, in several guises, came to dominate much of later economic thinking.
At the same time, the dynamic process of competition is considered to give
rise to observable regularities that emerge ex post, as an average of past
movements, from the actual variations in prices and pro…ts. An important
instance of such regularities is the equalization of pro…t rates.9
The objective of this paper was to propose an empirical framework in
which long-run pro…t rate di¤erentials can be estimated and the hypothesis
of equalization of pro…t rates can be tested. The statistical models employed
here aimed to account for the nonstationarity found in most industry pro…t
rates, and in the overall manufacturing pro…t rate. The …rst model, used for
16 out of the 20 industries in the sample, is a vector autoregressive model
for nonstationary variables developed by Johansen. The second type of
9The fact that the equalization of pro…t rates was assumed to take place ex post in
the classical theory runs contrary to an interpretation sometimes found in the literature:
equalization of expected pro…t rates. The equalization process is reduced in this interpre-
tation to a process that takes place inside the heads of the investors and not in the actual
battle of competition. The notion that expected pro…t rates are equalized is in fact a
proposition from the conventional (neoclassical) investment analysis dressed in “classical”
garb. It is well known that in the latter type of analysis, a …rm devotes to each investment
project an amount of capital so that an extra dollar invested in any project is expected to
yield the same return.
35model, used for 2 industries whose pro…t rates were found to be stationary,
employs the ARDL approach that allows for a mixture of unit root and
stationary processes. The common feature of both models is that they allow
for a statistically satisfactory estimation of the long-run centers of gravity of
pro…t rates and distinguishes between competitive and noncompetitive pro…t
rate di¤erentials. The hypothesis of pro…t rate equalization can be tested
in both frameworks as the null hypothesis of no competitive di¤erentials.
The failure to reject the null implies that the long-run pro…t rate di¤erential
consists only of a noncompetitive di¤erential, which can be interpreted as
industry-speci…c risk and other premia.
The data examined here is the annual pro…t rates of 20 manufacturing
industries in the United States during 1947–98. The indicator of pro…t rate
used is the ratio of pro…ts after depreciation to net …xed capital stock. In
order to determine the lag length to be used in the models, the …rst four
observations were set aside and all the results reported here pertain to the
period 1951-1998. The central …nding of the paper is that 14 out of the 20
industries studied have no signi…cant competitive pro…t rate di¤erentials in
the long-run; in other words, their pro…t rates are equalized in the long run
with the general pro…t rate, after allowing for risk and other premia. Over
the period under study, these industries accounted, on the average, for about
75 percent of net …xed capital stock and 72 percent of pro…ts in the man-
ufacturing sector. These results suggest that pro…t rate equalization may
be considered as a dominant, long-run tendency in the U.S. manufacturing
sector.
Nevertheless, it should be pointed out that the implementation of the
statistical model could be improved. Inference regarding cointegration and
equalization were conducted on the basis of asymptotic theory. To apply
36small-sample adjustments to the test statistics or to estimate sample-speci…c
critical values based on bootstrap methods would be one line of improve-
ment. The e¤ects of such improvements on the …ndings of the paper are
hard to predict. It is reasonable to expect that some pro…t rates might
no longer appear to be cointgerated with the general pro…t rate once the
small-sample adjustments have been made, just as some pro…t rates might
no longer appear to have signi…cant competitive di¤erentials. The …rst ex-
pectation is grounded on the well-known fact that, in small samples, the
Johansen cointegration test is biased towards rejecting the null of no cointe-
gration (Toda, 1994). The second expectation is based on the evidence from
recent Monte Carlo experiments suggesting that the likelihood ratio test for
structural hypothesis on cointegrating relations is biased towards rejecting
the null in small samples (Zhou, 2000).
Yet another way in which the …ndings here can be extended and re…ned
is to examine the properties of the adjustment process more closely. While I
have examined the stability of the long-run centers of gravity by construct-
ing the persistence pro…les of pro…t rates, several questions remain open:
How di¤erent are the speeds by which individual pro…t rates eliminate their
discrepancies from the long-run centers of gravity? How signi…cant is the
impact of this adjustment process on the trajectory of the general pro…t
rate itself? Does incorporating additional information about the properties
of adjustment process change the results regarding equalization? Within the
framework adopted here, these questions can be answered by a series of tests
on the vector ® (see equation (12)) and conducting the test of equalization
as a nested hypothesis test.
Further work would also address the sensitivity of the …ndings reported
in this paper to alternative indicators of the pro…t rate. Alternative in-
37dicators can be developed by changing what appears in the denominator,
the numerator or both for the formula for pro…t rate. For example, one
could de…ne capital to include, apart from structures and equipment, stocks
of inventories. Alternative indicators can also be developed by changing
the basis of valuation. For example, capital could be reckoned in historical
cost rather that current cost. Another line of enquiry would relate the es-
timated pro…t rate di¤erentials and the observed properties of adjustment
processes to factors which has been the focus of much of the applied studies
in industrial organization: degree of concentration, scale economies, product
di¤erentiation, foreign competition etc. It seems that, with suitable modi-
…cations, the approach suggested here may be capable of shedding light on
the overall character of competitive dynamics and the pro…t rate trajectories
of individual industries.
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